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INTRODUCTION

KCORDING

TO STATISTICS, more than sixty-five percent
X
f fatal general aviation accidents are pilot-related) The
vast majority of the light aircraft currently in operation in the
United States are equipped with dual controls. In lawsuits arising from the crash of such an aircraft, there is often some ques* Barbara Davydov Bleisch is in private practice in St. Louis, Missouri, primarily in the areas of aviation and insurance litigation and administrative matters.
Ms. Bleisch received her B.A. from Yale University in 1979, her M.A. (Slavic Languages) from the University of Kansas in 1982, and her J.D. from the University
of Kansas in 1984.
1 See AOPA AIR SAFETY FOUNDATION, 1996 NALL REPORT: ACCIDENT TRENDS
AND FACTORS FOR 1995 (1996).
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tion as to who was at the controls prior to the crash. This
question becomes particularly significant if there were two pilots
aboard, both of whom had access to the controls, and there are
no surviving eyewitnesses.
II.

LIABILITY CLAIMS

In the context of liability claims, courts have been called on
many times to decide what standard of proof to apply to the
question of pilot identity when a dual-control aircraft has
crashed, and there is no direct proof of who was controlling the
aircraft at the relevant time. Numerous reported decisions in
state and federal courts have addressed whether the claimant
has presented sufficient evidence to support a claim for pilot
negligence. These cases include decisions by the supreme
courts of several states.
In the absence of eyewitness testimony as to who was at the
controls during the events immediately preceding a crash, the
majority of courts have held that there is insufficient evidence to
justify submission of the case to the jury. In these cases, the
courts have granted a directed verdict or a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
Relatively few courts have allowed claims under these circumstances. Several courts have based their rulings on a presumption of the identity of the pilot in command, arising from the
relationship between the two pilots. The remaining cases in
which the courts have allowed the issue of the pilot's identity to
be submitted to the jury involve, for the most part, very clear
circumstantial evidence of who was actually in control of the
aircraft.
A.

MTCHELL

V.

EYRE

AND THE MAJORITY RULE

The claim in Mitchell v. Eyre2 arose from the crash of an Aeronca L-16 aircraft, equipped with dual controls, during an effectiveness test of the search and rescue capabilities of the Civil Air
Patrol (C.A.P.). The aircraft was occupied by two pilots. The
plaintiff's decedent had been a private pilot for more than six
years. Although there was no evidence of his piloting hours, he
was a training officer for the Civil Air Patrol, and was shown on
the C.A.P. form as an observer.
2

206 N.W.2d 839 (Neb. 1973).
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The defendant's decedent had approximately eighty-eight
hours of piloting experience. He was listed as the pilot in command on the C.A.P. form. The court noted, without detailing
the evidence, that he was the pilot at takeoff. The Nebraska
Supreme Court held that the defendant's motion for directed
verdict should have been sustained because proof of who was
piloting the aircraft at the time of takeoff was not conclusive as
to the identity of the pilot at the relevant time.' The court
explained:
the plaintiff was required to prove who was piloting the plane at
the time of the crash. Until she has done so she has not met her
burden of proof. The finding of negligence is immaterial until
we can determine the identity of the person to be charged with
responsibility for the negligence. An issue depending entirely
upon speculation, surmise, or conjecture is never sufficient to
sustain a judgment.4
The court reasoned that even though the evidence indicated
that the defendant's decedent was at the controls at takeoff, the
other pilot could have taken some action which precipitated the
difficulty. 5 Therefore, any conclusion on this question would be
based on surmise and conjecture. 6
The Mitchell decision has been recognized as the majority
rule.7 A number of other courts have held, based on similar
reasoning, that the plaintiffs claim alleging pilot negligence
could not be submitted to the jury because either pilot could
have taken the actions which directly caused the crash. 8
Several of these cases involve claims based on res ipsa loquitur.
The courts' ruling in favor of the defendants was the result of
the plaintiffs' inability to prove exclusive control, an essential
element of the cause of action for res ipsa.9 Other decisions are
3

See id. at 844.

4 Id.

5 See id.
6 See id.

See Udseth v. United States, 530 F.2d 860, 861 (10th Cir. 1976).
8 See, e.g., Lisa-Jet, Inc. v. Duncan Aviation, Inc., 569 F.2d 1044, 1047 (8th Cir.
1978); Udseth, 530 F.2d at 862; Martin v. United States, 448 F. Supp. 855, 872 (D.
Ark. 1977); In re Hayden's Estate, 254 P.2d 813, 821 (Kan. 1953). See also Mitchell,
206 N.W.2d at 844 (noting that in order to find negligence the negligent person
must be identified).
9 See, e.g., Udseth, 530 F.2d at 861-62; Towle v. Phillips, 172 S.W.2d 806, 808
(Tenn. 1943).
7
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based simply on the fact that the plaintiff could not prove that
the negligence, if any, was chargeable to the defendant.' 0
In several cases, the plaintiff presented substantial evidence as
to which pilot was in control at a specific time. Because the
plaintiff must prove that the defendant's actions caused the
crash, the courts have held that proof of who was in control even
minutes before does not justify a conclusion as to who was in
control at the precise moment that precipitated the crash.
For example, in In re Hayden's Estate," the evidence showed
that the defendant's decedent, Hayden, was the owner of the
aircraft, that he was in the left front seat, and that he had substantially more flying experience than the other front seat occupant. The Bellanca aircraft could not be taken off or landed
from the right seat because it was not equipped with a steerable
tail wheel, and there were no brake pedals on the right side.
Hayden had been barred from the airport before for perform-

ing maneuvers similar to those that led to the crash. Finally,
there was evidence that the left-side control wheel was pulled
off, the column was bent upwards, and Hayden was still strapped
into the left seat while the safety strap for the right seat was broken. The plaintiff argued that this circumstantial evidence
pointed directly to the acts of Hayden as the cause of the
crash. 12
Noting that none of the experts were able to say with certainty
who was at the controls at the time of the crash, the Kansas
Supreme Court pointed out that control of the plane could have
shifted between the two front-seat occupants at will after takeoff. 3 In sustaining the demurrer to the plaintiffs evidence, the
court held that "any answer to the question as to who was at the
controls of the plane at the moment of that regrettable tragedy
must be predicated upon speculation, surmise or conjecture. '1 4
B.

LANGE V NELSON-RYAN FLGI-LT SER viCE, INC.: NEGLIGENCE
IMPUTED TO THE FLIGHT INSTRUCTOR

Other courts have sought to avoid the apparent inequity of
this rule by imputing negligence based on the relationship be10See, e.g., Lisa-Jet, 569 F.2d at 1047-48; In re Hayden's Estate, 254 P.2d at 817-18
(quoting Snyder v. McDowell, 203 P.2d 225, 228 (Kan. 1949)).
11254 P.2d 813 (Kan. 1953).
12 See id. at 818.
13 See id. at 821.
14 Id. at 822.
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tween the two pilots. In Lange v. Nelson-Ryan Flight Service, Inc.15
the plaintiffs decedent held a commercial pilot's certificate with
an instructor rating. Before renting an aircraft from the defendant, he was required to go on a checkout flight with the defendant's employee flight instructor. The aircraft crashed shortly
after takeoff, and both occupants were killed.
The evidence indicated that the plaintiff s decedent was in the
front seat and the instructor was in the rear. After the crash, the
plaintiff's decedent's feet were found under the seat and his
hands over his head. The instructor's left hand was near the
throttle and his right hand was near the stick, and the position
of his feet also indicated that he was handling the controls at the
time of impact.
The Minnesota Supreme Court noted that the evidence was
reasonably clear that the instructor was at the controls at the
moment of impact. 16 However, based on the same reasoning
implemented in the cases discussed above, the court recognized
that this evidence does not prove that the instructor was at the
controls for any particular preceding period and that when the
controls passed from one to the other would be a matter of
conjecture. 7
While acknowledging its "inescapable ignorance of who did
what preceding the crash,"'" the court nonetheless overruled
the trial court's entry of judgment in favor of the defendant
notwithstanding the verdict.' 9 The court based its decision on
the evidence proving that the flight instructor was the "pilot in
command" throughout the flight. 20 The court concluded that if
an aircraft is operated negligently, the pilot in command is negligent, regardless of whether or not he was at the controls at the
time.21 Stating that the Civil Air Regulations (predecessor to the
Federal Aviation regulations) do not establish rules for the imposition of liability, the court nonetheless relied on the C.A.R.s
as the basis for its decision.22
The language of the Lange decision clearly indicates approval
of the general rule followed in Mitchell. In fact, the court ap15 108 N.W.2d 428 (Minn. 1961).
16 See id. at 431.
17 See id.
18 Id. at 432.

19 See id. at 433.
20 See id.

See id.
22 See id. at 432.
21
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plied the Mitchell rule to bar the defendant's assertion of contributory negligence, holding that "there was no evidence from
which the jury could reasonably infer which of the two men in
the plane was operating the controls at the time that the fatal
23
fault occurred.
Under the particular facts of Lange, the court's imputation of
negligence to the instructor results in a judgment that is plainly
inequitable and inconsistent with any other rule of law: if the
actual cause of the crash was the negligence of the student
(plaintiffs decedent), then the instructor is held liable to the
student for the student's own fault. Notably, two judges dissented, on the basis that the verdict was based on speculation
and conjecture.2 4 Furthermore, the Lange holding has been limited, at least by the federal district court in Minnesota, to that
25
particular fact pattern.
Although the Lange decision is often cited as the "minority
view," it is apparently the only case so holding. 26 A number of
courts have declined to follow the "pilot in command" argument, even under analogous facts. 7
C.

ComwNs, v.

Szo"1i

NEGLIGENCE IMPUTED TO THE OWNER

A similar result was reached in Collins v. Stroh28 on the basis
that one pilot-occupant was the owner of the aircraft. The plaintiff brought a claim for the wrongful death of a minor passenger
in the aircraft under the theory of res ipsa loquitur. The aircraft
was equipped with dual controls, two pilots were aboard, and
there were no survivors who could testify as to who was at the
controls at any particular time. The defendant argued that because res ipsa loquitor applies only if the defendant had exclusive
control of the aircraft, the plaintiffs had not met their burden of
29
proof.
23

/d. at 433.

24

See id.

25 See Held v. Mitsubishi Aircraft Int'l, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 369, 392 (D. Minn.
1987).
2' See Udseth v.United States, 530 F.2d 860 (10th Cir. 1976); Walker v. Imperial Casualty & Indern. Co., 564 P.2d 588, 591 (Kan. Ct. App. 1977).
27 See, e.g., Udseth, 530 F.2d at 861-62; Avernco Ins. Co. v. United States Fire Ins.
Co. 513 A.2d 962, 966 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986); Lisa-Jet, Inc. v. Duncan
Aviation, Inc., 569 F.2d 1044, 1047-48 (8th Cir. 1978); Jetcraft Corp. v. Flight
Safety Int'l, 16 F.3d 362, 364 (10th Cir. 1993).
2- 426 S.W.2d 681 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968).
29 See id. at 688-89.
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The Missouri Court of Appeals held that res ipsa loquitur was
properly applied to allow the plaintiffs to recover." The court
discussed evidence that only the defendant's decedent knew of
the destination, that he had more flying experience, and that
his experience and skill were what persuaded the plaintiffs decedent to make the trip. 1 However, the court's decision was
based primarily on the theory that because the defendant's decedent owned the plane and was aboard it, he had the "right of
control" and would be vicariously liable, even if the other pilot
was operating the controls at the relevant time. 2
The Collins decision appears to be based on a reasonable application of the common law rule on joint venture orjoint enterprise applicable at the time. However, the basic premise that
negligence will be imputed to the owner of a vehicle, absent a
common pecuniary interest, is contrary to the current status of
the common law in most states, including Missouri.3 Thus, the
decision in Collins is of limited, if any, precedential value.
At least one court has held that a flight school could be held
liable for the negligence of a student pilot because it was engaged in a joint enterprise with the student with the common
objective of obtaining a private pilot's license for the student. 4
Other plaintiffs have argued that liability should be imputed to
the owner because the "operator" of an aircraft, as defined by
statute, includes anyone authorizing its operation. 5 Nearly all
of the courts presented with this argument have held that this
definition alone does not support the imputation of liability to a
non-negligent owner.36
30

See id. at 689.

31 See id.
32

Id.

33 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 491 cmt. c (1965); Stover v. Patrick,

459 S.W.2d 393, 401 (Mo. 1970) (en banc); Shoemaker v. Whistler, 513 S.W. 2d
10,15 (Tex. 1974); Janet Boeth Jones, Annotation, Fact That Passenger in Negligently Operated Motor Vehicle is Owner as Affecting Passenger's Liability to or Rights
Against Third Person-Modern Cases, 37 A.L.R. 4th 565 (1985).
34 See Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 504 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975).
35 See 49 U.S.C. § 40102(32) (1994).
36 See, e.g., Rogers v. Ray Gardener Flying Serv., 435 F.2d 1389, 1394 (5th Cir.
1970); McCord v. Dixie Aviation Corp., 450 F.2d 1129 (10th Cir. 1971); Sanz v.
Renton Aviation, Inc., 13 Av. Case (CCH) 17,542 (9th Cir. 1975). But cf. Sosa v.
Young Flying Serv., 277 F. Supp. 554, 557 (S.D. Tex. 1967); Lamasters v.
Snodgrass, 85 N.W. 2d 622 (Iowa 1957) in which similar language in the statute
was interpreted as fixing liability on the owner "even though he is not in actual
control, for the negligent conduct of one to whom he entrusts his airplane." Id.
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PILOT IDENTITY AS A QUESTION FOR THE TRIER OF FACT

A few cases dealing with this issue have concluded, based on
the evidence presented, that the issue of the pilot's identity was
properly a question of fact for the jury. Most of these cases involve clear, if not overwhelming, evidence of who was the pilot
in control.
The plaintiff's claim in Todd v. Wikle"7 arose from the crash of
a Cessna Skymaster in instrument weather conditions. The survivors of Mrs. Weikle sued the corporate owner of the plane and
Mr. Todd, the corporate president, who was allegedly the pilot.
Relying on the general rule that jury speculation will not be
allowed, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals recognized that
the plaintiff should be required to submit probative evidence
that the individual claimed to be the pilot was the one in charge
of the controls at the critical instant of time. 8 However, the
court found that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to
allow submission of the plaintiffs claim to the jury.a That evidence included the following:
(1) Mr. Todd occupied the left-front seat, the seat customarily
occupied by the pilot;
(2) Mr. Todd was in communication with Air Traffic Control;
(3) Mr. Todd was the president of the company which owned
the aircraft and had over 740 hours of pilot time, including a
small amount under IFR conditions;
(4) Mrs. Weikle was a student pilot with 20-30 hours of pilot
time, all under VFR conditions;
(5) The weather conditions at takeoff and during the flight were
IFR;
(6) While the aircraft was equipped with dual controls, the instruments required for IFR flight were only in front of the left
seat;
(7) Mr. Todd was the pilot at takeoff;
Several state aviation statutes have imputed pilot negligence to the aircraft owner.
See, e.g., MIcH. COMP. LAws. ANN. § 259.180a (West 1997); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 360.012(4) (West 1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 2-03-05 (1997); See alsoJoseph E.

Edwards, Annotation, Provision of FederalAviation Act (49 U.S.C.A. § 1301(26)) That
Any Person Who Causes orAuthorizes Operation of Aircraft Shall Be Deemed to be Engaged
in Operation, as Basis for Vicarious Liability or for Imputing Pilot's Negligence to Owner

in Action Arising Out of Aircraft Accident, 11 A.L.R. Fed. 901 (1972).
17 376 A.2d 104 (Md. App. 1977).
39 See id. at 108-09.

39 See id. at 109.
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(8) There was no evidence that Mr. Todd was suddenly taken ill

or that Mrs. Weikle panicked.4"

The court also relied on the Maryland rule known as the "presumption of continuance" to hold that since Mr. Todd was in
contact with ATC approximately ten minutes before the accident and was presumably in control of the aircraft at that time,
one can presume that he was in control at the time of the
court
crash. 4 ' Based on the totality of the circumstances, 4the
2
held that the case was properly submitted to the jury.
The courts concluded in a number of other cases that there
was sufficient evidence of the pilot's identity to allow submission
of the case to the jury.4" In the majority of these cases the evidence, although circumstantial, was quite clear. For example,
the courts have universally allowed submission of the case to the
jury, despite the fact that the aircraft was equipped with dual
44
controls, when there was only one licensed pilot aboard. Similarly, where one of the pilots aboard had "sworn off' flying, and
the other communicated to the control tower that he "would
pass over the field", the question of pilot identity was properly
for the jury.45
One anomalous case is Suiter v. Collamer,46 in which (in a onepage opinion) the court held that res ipsa loquiturwas properly
applied, although there was no evidence of who was flying the
plane at the time it crashed.47
The issue of comparative fault was held to have been properly
submitted to the jury on the basis of circumstantial evidence in
Held v. Mitsubishi Aircraft International,Inc.4" Lange was the only
authority submitted to the court.4" The Federal District Court
in Minnesota distinguished Lange on the basis that there was
some circumstantial evidence of the pilot's identity.5" The eviId. at 109.
Id. at 110.
42 See id. at 111.
43 See, e.g., Tank v. Peterson, 363 N.W.2d 530, 538 (Neb. 1985) (distinguishing
Mitchell v. Eyre 206 N.W.2d 839 (Neb. 1973)); Lightenburger v. Gordon, 407
P.2d 728, 739 (Nev. 1965); Ayer v. Boyle, 112 Cal. Rptr. 636, 640 (Cal. App.
1974).
40
41

44 See, e.g., id.
45 See Boise Payette Lumber Co. v. Larsen, 214 F.2d 373, 377 (9th Cir. 1954).
46

235 N.E.2d 924 (N.Y. 1968).

47 See id. at 924.
48

672 F. Supp. 369 (D. Minn. 1987).

49 See id. at 392.
50

See id. at 392-93.
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dence included the fact that the pilot in the left seat was instrument rated (though not current). On the other hand, the fact
that the left-seat pilot was familiar with this airport, and the aircraft did not line up properly with the runway was cited as evidence that the other pilot was in control.51
E.

SUMMARY OF LIABILITY CASES

Although the various rulings on this issue have been characterized as three separate lines of cases, they actually follow a
fairly consistent pattern, depending on the level of circumstantial evidence presented.
Lange and similar cases that find an inference or presumption
of control are in conflict with more recent developments in the
law of vicarious liability, and therefore have questionable relevance. The few cases allowing the question to be submitted to
the jury involve, almost without exception, clear circumstantial
evidence of who was at the controls. These cases do not contradict the general rule that the jury will not be allowed to speculate; they are simply unusual fact patterns where the
circumstances show only a very minimal possibility that the second occupant could have taken control.
In general, when there is no direct evidence of who was actually in control of the aircraft at the crucial time, the question
should be decided by directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict. To hold otherwise would be to encourage
the jury to resort to speculation and conjecture to determine a
question of fact which simply cannot be known.
III.

INSURANCE COVERAGE CASES

The issue of pilot identity also arises frequently in the insurance context. The beneficiaries may raise the question in response to the standard life insurance exclusion for death
occurring while serving as a crew member in an aircraft. It may
also arise in response to the insurer's denial of coverage under
an aircraft insurance policy limiting coverage to certain pilots or
to pilots with certain qualifications. The outcome of these cases
depends in large part on the specific policy language.
51

See id.
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A.

LIFE INSURANCE

In the context of the life insurance exclusion, the insurer has
the burden of proving that the death resulted while the insured
was acting as a pilot or crew member, not as a passenger.5 2 The
outcome generally depends on the court's construction of the
specific policy language. The policy language addressed in Vander Laan v. Educators Mutual Ins. Co.53 excluded coverage if the
insured was killed "while operating ...

or serving as a member

of the crew" of an aircraft.5 4 The evidence showed that the insured was the owner of the plane, was in the left-front seat, was
shown in the flight plan as the pilot, handled most of the radio
communications, and had flown the plane during part of the
flight. The other pilot generally flew the aircraft, even if the
insured was aboard, and had flown the aircraft more than half
of the time during the trip.
The Michigan Supreme Court refused to enter a directed verdict for the insurer.5 5 Because there was evidence from which it
could be inferred that the insured was not at the controls or a
member of the crew at the time of the crash, as well as evidence
that he was, the question was properly for the jury. The court
refused to apply the Civil Aeronautics Manual definitions of "pilot in command" and "passenger" because they were not incor56
porated in the policy.

The Kansas Supreme Court reached a different conclusion in
construing similar language. The policy analyzed in Alliance Life
Insurance Co. v. Ulysses Volunteer Fireman's Relief Ass'n 57 excluded
coverage if the insured was killed "while piloting or serving as a
crew member" of an airplane.58 The court held that the policy
provision was ambiguous as to the relevant time, and, therefore,
should be strictly construed against the insurer. 59 The insurer
was therefore required to prove that the insured was the operator or a crew member at the time of the crash or at least when
the crash was imminent.6" The insurer conceded that it could
52 See In re Estate of Carroll, 857 S.W.2d 848, 851 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).

53 97 N.W.2d 6 (Mich. 1959).
54 Id. at 7.
55 See id. at 9.
56 See id. at 9-10.
57 529 P.2d 171 (Kan. 1974).
58 Id. at 176.
59 See id. at 179-80.
6 See id. at 180.
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not prove what the insured was doing at the instant of the crash,
and the court ordered judgment in favor of the insured.61
The question of the relevant time was further refined in Beckwith v. American Home Assurance Co.6 2 The undisputed evidence

in that case proved that the insured was at the controls when the
emergency arose, but surrendered the controls to the more experienced pilot. The other pilot attempted an emergency landing and was at the controls at the time of the crash. The court
held that the risk of loss increased while coverage was suspended, and because normal operating conditions were never
restored prior to the crash, coverage was never restored.6 "
In Walker v. Imperial Casualty and Indemnity Co.,64 the Court acknowledged that "[i] n the absence of direct evidence, the party
who must prove which of the two pilots was flying a dual-control
aircraft at the crucial time has an impossible burden."65 However, the court concluded that a student pilot taking a flying
lesson and logging time as a student pilot is participating as an
operator of the aircraft.66 Therefore, it was not necessary to determine who was actually at the controls of the aircraft when it
fell from the sky.67 Conversely, in two cases involving only partial dual controls, two courts as the finders of fact concluded
that the insurer had not proved that the insured was at the
controls.68
B.

AIRCRAFr INSURANCE

When the insurer denies coverage under an aircraft insurance
policy because the pilot did not meet the qualifications specified
in the pilot warranty endorsement, the question of the pilot's
identity can be the deciding factor. At least one court has held
that this issue was properly submitted to the jury based on evidence that the named pilot was the owner of the new two hundred horsepower Mooney aircraft, had flown it on many
occasions, and was in the left seat, while the right-seat pilot had
See id.
565 F. Supp. 458 (W.D.N.C. 1983).
63 See id. at 461.
564 P.2d 588 (Kan. Ct. App. 1977).
65 Id. at 592.
66 See id.
67 See id.
68 See Daman v. New York Life Ins. Co., 540 F.2d 382, 383-84 (8th Cir. 1976);
Durand v. Horace Mann Life Ins. Co., 543 So. 2d 579, 581 (La. Ct. App. 1989).
61

62
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never flown the aircraft.6 9 The fact that an aircraft had only one
control wheel has also been held sufficient to justify a jury verdict as to pilot identity.7 0
The question of pilot identity also arises in construing an exclusion for any person operating the aircraft under the terms of
a rental agreement. In Avemco Ins. Co. v. United States Fire Ins.
Co.71 the court held that the exclusion applies not only to the
individual entering into the rental agreement, but to anyone op72
erating the aircraft while it is subject to a rental agreement.
Nonetheless, the insurer could not prevail because it could not
establish which pilot was operating the aircraft.7 " The Avemco
court further declined to incorporate the definition of "pilot in
command" under the Federal Aviation Regulation to create a
presumption of responsibility, suggesting that the policy definition of "operating" could be made more specific to cover this
type of situation."
A number of cases have addressed the situation where the evidence indicates that two pilots were simultaneously controlling
75
the aircraft. Master Feeders II, Inc. v. United States Fire Ins. Co.
involved a provision that coverage applies "only while the aircraft is being operated by" the approved pilot, in conjunction
with an exclusion "while the aircraft is in flight and.., operated
by any pilot other than as specified in the declarations."7 6 The
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted the policy as providing coverage "only when a qualified pilot is operating the aircraft
and not then if anyone else is operating the plane, too." 7 7 The
court, therefore held that there was no coverage while the aircraft was simultaneously operated by two pilots, even though
one was qualified under the policy.7" A similar result was
69 See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Butte Aero Sales & Serv., 243 F. Supp. 276,

281 (D. Mont. 1965).
70 See Underwriters at Lloyds, London v. Cherokee Lab., Inc., 288 F.2d 95, 98
(10th Cir. 1961).
71513 A.2d 962 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986).
72 See id. at 965-66.
73 See id. at 966.
74 Id.
75 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14395, *14-15, aff'd, 17 Av. Cas. (CCH)
18,205 (10th
Cir. 1983).
76 Id.
77 Id. at *15 (emphasis added).
78 See id.
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reached in Powell Valley Elec. Coop., Inc. v. United States Aviation
79
Underwriters, Inc.
However, the Texas Supreme Court reached a contrary conclusion when it interpreted a provision excluding coverage
"while the aircraft is in flight . . . if piloted by other than the
pilot or pilots designated in the declarations," with the declarations stating that the aircraft "will be piloted only by" the listed
approved pilots with the listed qualifications.8 0 Holding that the
policy was ambiguous, the court ruled that if either of the two
simultaneous pilots was qualified, coverage was in force.,' The
Kentucky Supreme Court has also ruled under similar circumstances that coverage was in force based on reasoning that the
qualified pilot was the pilot in command pursuant to the Federal Aviation Regulations 8and
was, therefore, responsible for the
2
operation of the aircraft.
C.

SUMMARY OF INSURANCE CASES

The insurance cases addressing this issue depend primarily on
the specific policy language. However, based on the same general principles applied in the liability cases, the outcome will
often depend on the level of circumstantial evidence and which
party bears the burden of proof.
IV. CONCLUSION
In matters arising from the crash of aircraft equipped with
dual controls and with no surviving eyewitnesses, the party with
the burden of proof has a very difficult task. A party seeking to
prove which pilot was in control should be conscientious about
promptly collecting all available circumstantial evidence. Considering the factors analyzed in the above cases, this would include the following types of information:
* Eyewitness testimony as to the identity of the pilot in control
at any particular point in 8the
flight;"
4
" Ownership of the aircraft;
79 179 F. Supp. 616, 619 (W.D. Va. 1959).
80 Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Hudson Energy Co., 811 S.W. 8d 522, 554 (Tex.
1991).
81 See id. at 556.
82 See Marshall v. Peerless Ins. Co., 428 S.W.2d 190, 192 (Ky. 1968).

83 See generally Todd, 376 A.2d at 104; Mitchell, 206 N.W.2d at 839.
84 See generally Collins, 426 S.W.2d at 689; Butte Aero, 243 F. Supp. at 281; Todd,
376 A.2d at 104; Hayden, 254 P.2d 813.
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" Qualifications and experience of the occupants;"
86
" The controls and instruments available to each pilot;
* The relationship between the two pilots, particularly if one
was a flight instructor;8 7
* The relationship between each pilot and the plaintiff, if the
plaintiff was a non-pilot; 8
" Which pilot communicated on the radio and the content of
the communications;8 9
* The circumstances leading up to the flight, such as who decided on the destination, who invited whom, and whose purposes were being served;9"
" The location of each pilot within the aircraft and the identity
of the pilot in the seat customarily occupied by the pilot;9 1
* Forensic evidence as to the condition of the seatbelts and the
controls and the positions of the pilots' hands and feet after
92
impact.
If the circumstantial evidence points very clearly to one pilot
or the other, the court may allow the case to be submitted to the
jury. But in the vast majority of cases, a judgment as a matter of
law will be appropriate and consistent with precedent. Any
other result could only be based on speculation and conjecture
by the trier of fact.

85 See generally Held, 572 F. Supp. at 392-93; Todd, 376 A.2d at 104; Hayden, 254
P.2d 813; Tank, 363 N.W.2d at 530; Lightenburger,407 P.2d at 728; Ayer, 112 Cal.

Rptr. 636.
86 See generally Hayden, 254 P.2d at 813; Todd, 376 P.2d 104; Daman, 540 F.2d at
382; Undenriters at Lloyds, London, 288 F.2d at 97.
87 See generally Lange, 108 N.W.2d at 428; Udseth, 530 F.2d at 860; Lisa-Jet, 569

F.2d at 1044; Jetcraft, 16 F.3d at 362.
88 See generally Collins, 426 S.W.2d at 689.
89 See generally Boise Payette, 214 F.2d at 377; Todd, 376 A.2d at 104.
90 See generally Collins, 426 S.W.2d at 689.
91 See generally Butte Aero, 243 F. Supp. at 281; Durand 543 So. 2d at 579; Todd,
376 A.2d at 104; Vander Laan, 97 N.W.2d at 9; Hayden, 254 P.2d 813.
92 See generally Lange, 108 N.W.2d 428; Hayden, 254 P.2d 813.
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